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Summary 
This paper summarizes recent developments in Dutch occupational pensions of both the DC and DB 
type. A reform of DB schemes is discussed that introduces financial assets as individual entitlements. 
At the same time, the reformed schemes derive (dis)saving, financial risk management and insurance 
decisions from the explicit objective of adequate and stable lifelong retirement income. In fact, the 
proposed system involves not only financial assets in individual accounts but also an insurance 
contract pooling longevity risks and possibly collective buffers that share systematic risks with future 
pension savers. The paper identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch contract design and 
draws lessons for other countries. 
 
1. Introduction  
The main design questions for funded pension contracts are similar across countries. Denmark 
(Finanstylnet (2017)) and Germany (Maurer et al. (2016)) consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of pension guarantees. The UK mandated the payout of retirement products in terms 
of deferred annuities until April 2016 but now allows full lump-sum withdrawal. Australia discusses 
whether to set-up an insurance market for lifelong income provisions on top of the current 
drawdown options without longevity insurance. Variable annuities, with or without guaranteed 
lifetime withdrawal benefits (GLWB-rider), are a large market in the US (Koijen and Yogo (2017)).  
Proper understanding of the contract designs in different countries is important in order to draw 
lessons from international experience. This paper summarizes recent developments in occupational 
pensions in the Netherlands. It identifies the strengths and weaknesses of Dutch contract designs 
and draws lessons for other countries.  
Contract design of occupational pensions is heavily debated in the Netherlands. As regards Defined 
Contribution (DC) contracts, the requirement to provide guaranteed fixed nominal lifetime income 
during the payout phase was lifted in 2016. Hence, variable annuities can be offered during the 
decumulation phase. At the same time, the new legislations maintained the compulsion to offer 
lifelong payments by pooling idiosyncratic longevity risks.  
DB pensions are the dominant contracts in the Netherlands. Also these schemes have been in flux 
during the past decade. The pension entitlements in these schemes are defined in terms of 
(deferred) annuities also during the accumulation phase. Employers have progressively withdrawn as 
risk sponsors of these schemes during this period. Participants thus bear more systematic 
investment and longevity risks in stand-alone pension schemes.  In particular, cost of living 
                                                            
1 Both authors are affiliated with Tilburg University and Netspar. We thank Dirk Broeders, Kees Goudswaard, Marike Knoef, Ralph Koijen  
and Bas Werker for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  
2 
 
adjustments depend on the funding status of the schemes and pensions in payments can be cut in 
case of underfunding.  
Currently under discussion is a more far-reaching reform for DB pensions.  This reform replaces 
(deferred) variable annuities by financial assets as individual entitlements.   At the same time, the 
design continues to focus on stable and adequate lifelong income during retirement as the starting 
point for decisions on (dis)saving, investment and insurance. In fact, the proposed system involves 
not only financial assets in personal accounts but also insurance contracts pooling longevity risks and 
possibly collective buffers that share systematic risks with future pension savers. We refer to this 
proposed contract as Personal Pensions with Risk-sharing and Collective Buffers (PPR-CB). Personal 
Pensions refer to individual accounts of financial assets, Risk-sharing involves pooling longevity risks 
in insurance contracts, while the Collective Buffers share systematic risks with future pension savers.   
The Dutch PPR design attempts to combine the best of the two worlds of Defined Benefit (DB) and 
Defined Contribution (DC). Like DB contracts, a PPR aims to provide stable lifelong retirement 
income by contributing sufficient resources, hedging interest rate risks, smoothing investment 
returns and pooling idiosyncratic longevity risks. The so-called Defined Ambition (DA) design of a PPR 
takes the desired retirement income stream as a starting point and endogenously derives the 
(dis)saving, investment and insurance options from that objective for retirement income. In contrast 
to traditional DB plans, benefits are not necessarily guaranteed, as lifelong guarantees have become 
quite costly in the current low-interest environment. Another difference with traditional DB plans is 
that the PPR design allows (dis)saving, investment and insurance to be tailored to personal 
characteristics of the participants. Moreover, the valuation of individual entitlements and the 
relationship between contributions and the accrual of entitlements are less complex than their 
counterparts found in variable annuities in current DB plans. The combination of a richer menu of 
instruments with which to tailor risk management and more transparent personal property rights 
prevents intergenerational conflicts about investment and distribution.  
Terminology contract designs 
PPR: Personal Pensions with Risk-sharing refers to contract designs combining old-age insurance with 
personal financial investments. Personal capital changes in a transparent way due to contributions (or 
drawdowns), investment returns and possibly biometric returns on account of longevity insurance. 
The various components of the pension contract ((dis)saving, financial investments, insurances) can 
be adjusted flexibly.  See Bovenberg and Nijman (2016). 
PPR-VA: A PPR design based on variable lifelong annuities in the drawdown phase 
Dutch-DC: The current (as of 2016) Dutch Defined Contribution contracts, which combine age-
dependent contributions during the accumulation phase with PPR-VA during the payout phase 
Dutch-DB: The current Dutch DB contracts based on (deferred) variable annuities as individual 
entitlements already in the accumulation phase and adjustments (positive and negative) of these 
entitlements based on the collective funding rate 
PPR-CB:  A PPR design based on variable lifelong annuities in the drawdown phase as well as 
collective buffers that share risks over time with future pension savers 
DA:  A Defined Ambition1 (DA) design derives the required (dis)saving, investment and insurance 
strategy from the desired properties of the retirement income stream (level, volatility of adjustments, 




     
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes Dutch retirement income provisions.  
Section 3 outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the current DB contracts in occupational 
pensions. Section 4 outlines new legislation on decumulation of DC contracts.  Section 5 explores 
proposals on personal pensions with risk-sharing and collective buffers. Section 6 identifies lessons 
for other countries. Section 7 concludes. The paper updates Bovenberg and Nijman (2009) and 
Bovenberg, Mehlkopf and Nijman (2015). These latter papers offer more detail on older contract 
designs and earlier policy discussions.   
2.   Dutch occupational pensions2  
 
Three-pillar system  
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first is a pay-as-you-go public pension 
scheme. This Beveridge-type public system provides a uniform, flat pension to all residents at a level 
that is related to the minimum wage. The Dutch government thus provides only a relatively small 
part of pension income for workers who earn middle and higher incomes. If these workers want to 
maintain their standard of living in retirement, they need additional pension income. As the second 
pillar of pension provision, occupational pensions provide supplementary pension income for these 
workers.  In contrast to the first pillar, the second pillar is earnings-related, and aims at maintaining 
the standard of living of middle-class workers during retirement. The third pillar consists of voluntary 
personal pension provisions, which are tax-favored up to a ceiling. This pillar is especially important 
for self-employed individuals because these workers typically do not participate in occupational 
pension provisions.  
 
Occupational pensions 
This paper focuses on the occupational pensions (second pillar). Occupational pension provisions are 
typically part of labor contracts, which are negotiated between unions and employers in collective 
labor agreements. Employees are thus obliged to participate in the negotiated pension scheme. As a 
result, occupational schemes cover more than 90% of the labor force in the Netherlands. These 
schemes are funded; the value of assets in the occupational pensions  currently amounts to about 
1,4 trillion Euro (150% of GDP).3 
 
Governance   
Second-pillar pension funds are independent non-profit trusts with their own governance and 
administrative structures. The governing board of a pension fund traditionally consists of an equal 
number of representatives of employers and unions – although more recently also retirees and 
independent specialists can be board members. These members of the governing board act as 
fiduciary trustees. They determine investments, contribution levels and cost-of-living adjustments 
for benefits. Industry-wide pension funds arrange pensions for workers in a specific sector of the 
economy. These sectoral funds own more than two-thirds of the assets in the second pillar, and 
account for more than 80% of the active participants. A company can opt out of an industry fund 
only if it offers a better pension plan than the plan of the sectoral fund.  
 
 
                                                            
2 This section updates Section 2 in Bovenberg, Mehlkopf and Nijman (2015) 
3 In terms of active participants, the most important type of pension fund is a company pension fund. To provide pension benefits to its 




Deferred annuity plans 
The vast majority of occupational pensions in the Netherlands are structured as (deferred) annuity 
contracts. These annuities are no longer guaranteed and have become variable annuities. Pension 
funds do not fully hedge their legal liabilities. In addition, employers have retreated as risk-bearing 
sponsors of pension plans, which are now typically stand-alone. In addition, due to the maturing and 
aging of pension plans, higher pension contributions have become less effective instruments to 
finance funding gaps.  Moreover, the pension contributions in many sectors have reached levels as 
high as around 20% of the wage sum (above a so-called franchise level accounting for the flat public 
benefit). Hence, raising contribution levels further in order to stabilize benefits has become less 
attractive. Contribution rates are thus more or less fixed in many sectors. Stable contributions and 
risk-bearing investments in the absence of outside risk-bearing sponsors imply that annuities have 
become variable. We will refer to these variable annuity plans as defined-benefit (DB) plans because 
individual property rights are defined in terms of an income stream rather than a capital claim.4  
 
Back-loading of accumulation  
The Dutch DB plans aim at a specific lifetime income stream during retirement. Years of service and 
a reference wage typically determine the annuity entitlement of an individual participant. The 
reference wage used to be the final wage, but in the beginning of this century most funds moved to 
career-average schemes. In these latter schemes, entitlements accumulate based on a percentage of 
the average wage level during the career. Schemes typically aim at an annuity level about 75% of 
average pay (including the flat public benefit) after 40 years of service. The benefit accrual (in terms 
of annuity level) is uniform across age groups. Hence, if the aim is to provide 75% of average pay 
after a working career of 40 years, the annual accrual rate is 75% /40 = 1.875%. 
The accrual rate of annuity units is the same for all workers – irrespective of age. This so-called 
uniform accrual implies that benefits are backloaded, because the time value of money implies that 
the value of the (deferred) annuity (as a percentage of the wage) rises with age. Despite this back-
loading of benefit accrual, industry funds charge the same premium rate for the annuity units 
irrespective of age. This combination of uniform (i.e. age-independent) accrual and uniform 
contributions implies that firms with a younger workforce typically5 subsidize other firms with an 
older workforce in the same sector. This redistribution implies that the funded system includes an 
implicit pay-as-you-go element.  
 
Variable annuities  
Pension funds aim to index the annuities to wage or price inflation6, but these increases in 
entitlements are conditional on the funding rate (i.e. the ratio between assets and liabilities) of the 
fund. Moreover, pension rights and thus pension payments can be cut in nominal terms if the assets 
of a fund are smaller than the value of the nominal liabilities (i.e. the value of the annuities excluding 
indexation). 7 Government regulation requires that a funding shortage is in expectation resolved 
within a ten-year period. In calculating the scope for recovery, funds can use expected returns on 
assets. Hence, risk premia on risky assets contribute to the potential for recovery. Funds, however, 
are not allowed to increase mismatch risk if they are in a so-called recovery program.8 
 
                                                            
4 Others refer to these variable annuity schemes as Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) schemes because the participants bear 
investment risk. Some company schemes have recently moved to DC schemes in which individual property rights are defined in terms of a 
claim on financial capital. Hence, each participant has his or her own investment account.  
5 A peculiarity of the DB contracts is that the purchase price of annuities is typically based on an expected, real rate of return, whereas the 
valuation of liabilities and thus the pay-out rates (which depend on the funding rate defined as the ratio of assets and liabilities) are based 
on the nominal risk-free interest rate. Due to low interest rates in recent years, a gap has opened up between the discount rate for 
computing the accruals and the discount rate for computing the funding rate. As a result, rights that have been accumulated in the past 
subsidize newly accumulated rights. This results in reverse redistribution from older to younger participants.    
6 Most schemes aim to index the deferred annuities to wages during the accumulation phase. During the decumulation phase, they 
typically target prices.   
7 Several Dutch Pension funds had to cut benefits in April 2013. See Bovenberg, Mehlkopf and Nijman (2015) 




Nominal liabilities computed with market interest rates… 
Solvency regulations of DB plans are based on the idea that annuities are guarantees even though 
they are not guaranteed in practice. In particular, Dutch pension funds must calculate nominal 
liabilities on the basis of the term structure of nominal risk-free interest rates (based on European 
swap rates) published by the Dutch Central Bank. This valuation method was introduced in 2007.9 
Before that time, pension funds discounted their liabilities against a fixed discount rate of 4%. The 
introduction of valuation on the basis of market interest rates did not have a substantial effect on 
funding rates when the system was introduced, as market interest rates were close to 4% in 2007. 
This changed after the financial crisis in 2008, when interest rates started to drop substantially.10 
 
DC plans  
A small but increasing part of Dutch occupational pensions is based on DC plans. During the 
accumulation phase, individual property rights are defined in terms of a claim on financial capital in 
personal accounts rather than as deferred annuities. In fact, several company schemes have recently 
moved to such schemes. Moreover, several DB pension funds also run DC plans for additional 
voluntary contributions on top of mandatory accruals in the DB fund11. Third-pillar arrangements are 
also based on DC plans.  The ceilings for tax-privileged contributions (in percentage of income) rise 
with age. This back-loading of contribution levels reflects the Dutch DB tradition with uniform 
accruals of deferred annuities during the working career. A second aspect that distinguishes Dutch 
second-pillar DC plans from those in other countries is that at retirement the accumulated capital 
must be converted into a lifelong annuity12. Also this reflects the annuity insurance tradition of the 
Netherlands.  
 
DB versus DC plans  
Section 4 provides more detail on the Dutch DC plans, which serve as a benchmark for reform of the 
DB plans. Indeed, both DB and DC feature strengths. DC plans provide more transparency about the 
valuation of individual entitlements in general and the relationship between contributions and 
accrual of entitlements in particular. They thus yield more secure property rights and alleviate 
conflicts of interest between generations. Moreover, in DC schemes payments can be tailored to 
individual needs. The income frame of DB schemes aids communication to participants. In addition, 
it offers a helpful choice architecture for managing macro-economic (interest rate) risk and insuring 
idiosyncratic longevity risk (particularly for those who become very old).    
 
 
3. Dutch DB contracts: Strengths, drivers of change and desired requirements  
 
Dutch occupational pensions feature a number of strengths (see Bovenberg, Mehlkopf and Nijman 
(2015)). In fact, Dutch occupational pension schemes are among the best in the world. One may thus 
wonder why the Dutch are reforming these pensions. After summarizing the main strengths of Dutch 
occupational schemes, this section identifies the drivers of reform. It also outlines the main criteria 
that should be met by sustainable occupational pensions.  
 
Strength: Income frame 
                                                            
9 This valuation method was amended in 2012 with the Ultimate Forward Methodology (UFR) to determine discount rates beyond the 20-
year horizon. This methodology was adjusted in July 2015. 
10 To determine the purchase price of annuities, most funds still employ an expected, real rate of return as discount rate rather than the 
risk-free interest rate.  Due to low interest rates in recent years, a gap has opened up between the discount rate for computing the price 
of new accruals and the discount rate for computing the funding rate. See also footnote 5.  
11 Collective labor agreements often cap the mandatory pension accrual at a certain income level. The government has imposed an income 
ceiling of approximately 100,000 Euros per year for certain tax privileges for mandatory occupational schemes.    
12 This requirement does not apply for pension products offered by banks. This is a small market, however, which we ignore here for the 
sake of simplicity.  
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First of all, the income frame inherent in the Dutch design focuses on adequate and stable lifelong 
income streams in retirement. Savings and investment strategies during accumulation are derived 
from desirable properties of the income stream during decumulation. Hence, hedging of interest-
rate risks becomes important. If interest rates drop, more capital is required to be able to withdraw 
the same income in future years. Longevity risks are pooled, which keeps lifelong retirement income 
affordable and is quite important towards end of life. 
 
Strength: Choice architecture and strengthening position of financial consumers  
Collective decision making in pension funds protects individual participants against behavioral 
biases. In particular, trustees help participants with complex decisions on (dis)saving and the 
management of systematic financial risks and idiosyncratic risks in insurance. In this connection, the 
high participation rates and high mandatory contributions negotiated by social partners in collective 
labor agreements combat the myopia of individual participants. A related strength is that pension 
schemes bring together consumers who can then operate as a wholesale group in financial markets. 
This alleviates agency issues due to a weak position of financially illiterate consumers in retail 
markets.  
 
Strength: More complete financial and insurance markets  
Dutch pension schemes also complete insurance and financial markets. By forming collective pools 
to pool longevity risk, pension schemes combat adverse selection in longevity insurance. Indeed, the 
insurance of idiosyncratic longevity risk allows pension schemes to offer stable benefits for life13. 
Moreover, systematic longevity risk, which is not traded in financial markets, is traded between 
generations in the pension schemes. This can contribute to more stable retirement benefits. Many 
would also consider the option to share systematic financial and longevity risks with future 
generations as one of the strengths of the system.14 
   
                                                            
13 Small lump-sum payments at retirement have been proposed though and might be introduced in the near future. 
14 The advantages and disadvantages of risk-sharing with future generations are heavily debated in the Netherlands. We elaborate on 
this in Section 6.    
 
Summary of strengths and drivers for change in Dutch contract design 
 
              Strengths: 
 High coverage and substantial contributions due to semi-mandatory nature in collective 
labor agreements 
 Focus on stable lifelong retirement yields high saving rates, advanced risk management 
(e.g. hedging interest-rate risk) and substantial insurance. 
 Trustees protecting individual participants against behavioral biases and agency issues 
 Increased bargaining strength of consumers in financial markets   
 Pooling idiosyncratic longevity risks in collective solidarity pools 
 Internal trade of systematic longevity risk, thereby filling gaps in financial markets     
 Sharing of systematic risks with future generations  
 
              Drivers of change:   
o Labor markets become more dynamic 
o Investment risks are increasingly borne by participants of the schemes. This raises the 
demand for transparency regarding pricing and individual property rights in order to 
avoid conflicts of interest between participants  






While the strengths are to be cherished, many agree that the current system is to be adjusted. We 
identify three main drivers of reform.   
 
Driver #1: Transitional labor market  
The Dutch DB system was built many years ago in a world in which almost every worker worked 40 
years as a fulltime employee, often with the same employer. The uniform accrual and uniform 
contribution rates referred to in Section 2 imply that participants pay an implicit tax on their pension 
contribution at young ages but are subsidized by older employees. However, career interruptions 
and labor market mobility across sectors and employers are becoming more common. An individual 
may work fulltime at some ages and part-time later on— or work as an employee in the beginning of 
their work career and then switch later to self-employment. An actuarially fair system in which 
contributions correspond to the value of the retirement benefits accumulated in a particular year is 
more efficient and equitable in transitional labor markets. An actuarially fair system will also make it 
easier for the self-employed to participate. 15  How to induce these workers to build up pension 
rights is a major policy issue in the Netherlands. It is related to the broader issue of a dual labor 
market in which a growing group of self-employed individuals does not participate in social 
insurance. Indeed, the dual labor market economy endangers the high level of participation in 
occupational pension schemes (and social insurance in general) because the self-employed do not 
participate in the second pillar.       
      
Not only efficiency but also equity arguments support a more actuarially fair pension system. Several 
studies have shown that higher income groups feature steeper income profiles than lower income 
groups do.  The first group is consequently subsidized at much higher income levels than the levels 
at which they paid in contributions. A more actuarially fair system removes this reverse solidarity 
from lower to higher income groups. A similar equity argument applies towards people that are 
employed in the beginning of their career and become self-employed later.  
  
Driver #2: Valuation and determination of individual risks  
Investment risks are increasingly borne by individual participants. This has made market-consistent 
valuation of deferred annuities complex. Indeed, the link between the contributions and the value of 
annuities has become opaque. Moreover, the pricing of the annuities is inconsistent with the rules 
for computing the funding rate because different discount rates are used16. Also the relationship 
between the funding rate, on the one hand, and cost of living adjustments or nominal benefit cuts, 
on the other, has been adjusted frequently. These revisions often imply substantial but 
intransparent value transfers from one group to another. The combination of conflicts of interest 
among generations and a complex and intransparent system have eroded trust in the DB system, 
which has become increasingly politicized.  Some young participants even question whether there 
will be a pension for them when they retire. The intergenerational conflicts have also led to more 
political interference in occupational pensions. These pensions thus have an increasingly public 
character, with less discretion for the governing boards to tailor their policies to the features of their 
participants.   
  
Driver #3: Heterogeneity and big data   
Not only the intransparent valuation but also the one-size-fits-all design of DB funds leads to 
conflicts of interest about investments and contributions. Participants differ substantially in terms of 
age, accrued rights, other savings, housing status, preferences and so forth. Despite this 
                                                            
15 Actuarial fair choice is important also to avoid choice at the expense of other participants. Many envisage that more options for choice 
of the contribution rate will emerge—for instance, where one can choose either to repay one’s mortgage or to contribute to the 
occupational pension system. Heterogeneity of participants and choice are discussed in more detail later. 
16 See footnote 5. 
8 
 
heterogeneity, (dis)saving and investment profiles are the same for all. Van Ewijk et al. (2017) show 
that pension contracts that are better aligned with characteristics and preferences of the individual 
can substantially enhance welfare. Information technology and big data offer more opportunities to 
“know your customer” (due e.g. to “big data”) and thus to tailor the pension product to individual 
needs. This is, however, not easily accomplished in the current “one-size-fits-all” design of DB plans. 
 
Desirable requirements of Dutch occupational pensions     
What are the criteria for sustainable occupational pensions? The goal of the reform of occupational 
pensions is to provide stable lifelong pension income at low costs. Retirement products should be 
priced transparently and fairly in order to avoid labor market distortions and conflicts of interest 
among participants. Trust in the system requires that the fund provides each individual with 
adequate information on the risk profile of the income streams in retirement. The fund should also 
show individuals how the value of their pension entitlements has developed as a result of 
contributions, investment returns in financial markets and biometric returns on account of 
insurance. The new contracts should provide trustees with more levers with which to tailor the 
pension contract to the individual. Instead of merely offering more individual choice options to 
agents with limited financial abilities, schemes should offer adequate and flexible choice 
architectures with defaults tailored to individual characteristics.  If schemes offer individual 
participants explicit choices, these choices should be priced in an actuarially fair fashion in order not 
to distort these choices.   
 
 
4. Dutch DC contracts  
 
The DC market is currently only a small part (about 10% in asset value) of the total market for Dutch 
occupational pensions. DC contracts are relevant for DB contracts, however, because they provide a 
benchmark for the reform of the DB contracts. 
 
Accumulation phase 
In the accumulation phase of Dutch DC contracts, pension contributions are added to personal 
accounts and invested in financial markets. In third-pillar contracts, the agents can choose the 
investment strategy themselves. In occupational pensions, however, the board of the pension fund 
determines investments. Second-pillar contributions (as a percentage of income minus a threshold) 
are a mandatory part of the labor contract and typically rise with age but are uniform for all 
employees of a certain age.   
 
Pay-out phase: investment and longevity risk…  
Until recently, Dutch DC capital had to be decumulated as a guaranteed lifelong nominal income 
stream provided by an insurer. Individuals thus could take neither investment risk nor (micro and 
 
Summary of desirable requirements of Dutch occupational pensions 
 
 Stable and adequate life-long pension income at low costs 
 Actuarially fair pricing of participation and other choices 
 Adequate information on income streams as well as capital 




macro) longevity risk during the decumulation phase. As of September 2016, a guaranteed lifelong 
nominal income stream is still the default option, but agents can choose to take investment risk. As 
regards longevity risk, the capital of agents that pass away must be allocated to the other 
participants in an insurance pool as a so-called biometric return. Base risk and macro longevity risk 
(i.e. unexpected adjustments in mortality tables), however, can now be shared among participants 
within an insurance pool.   
 
….and drawdown speed  
The reform of the payout design of DC plans in 2016 liberalized not only investment risk but also 
withdrawal speeds. The maximum annual income that can be withdrawn is determined in such a 
way that the expected (nominal) income level does not decline during the rest of life. In particular, 
the Assumed Interest Rate (AIR) determining the initial payout cannot exceed the expected return 
on the investment portfolio. This expected return is derived from the actual allocation in risky 
investments and legislative assumptions on the risk premium. Hence, more income can be drawn if 
more investment risk is taken. Myopic agents thus face incentives to take more risk. To reduce these 
incentives, the government requires pension administrators to provide income projections for 
pessimistic scenarios in which expected investment returns do not materialize.  Moreover, the 
allocation to risky assets that can be used to calculate the AIR is capped at 35% of the portfolio.17  
 
Empirical illustration  
The core properties of the new rules for decumulation of DC capital can be illustrated numerically. A 
technical explanation that contains the assumptions behind the numerical illustration is provided in 
Balter and Werker (2017). In this example, the interest rate is 1%, the equity premium 4%, the 
volatility of equity returns 20% and (for simplicity) the deterministic date of death 20 years after 
retirement. Figures 1 to 4 show the risk profile of retirement income for two asset allocations to 
equities, namely either 20% or 35%. In figure 1, the AIR equals the risk free rate; in figures 2 and 3 
the AIR coincides with the expected portfolio return; in figure 4 it exceeds the expected portfolio 
return. The expected income is increasing with age if the AIR is less than the expected portfolio 
return and vice versa. Initial income depends on the AIR and increases if more investment risk is 
taken and the maximum AIR is used. Not surprisingly, the outcome in the pessimistic scenario 
worsens if more risk is taken. Legislation does not allow the case in figure 4 because expected 
income declines.   
The main results are summarized in table 1.     
      
                                                            






Fig 1 AIR = risk free rate 20% 1,0% 457 increasing
Fig 2 AIR = exp ptf return 20% 1.8% 492 flat
Fig 3 AIR = exp ptf return 35% 2.4% 518 flat






Table 1. Summary of results in figures 1 to 4 
Figure 1: Income profiles   
 
(a): Asset allocation 20% equities; AIR= r 
 
 
(b): Asset allocation 20% equities; AIR = exp ptf 
return 
 
(c): Asset allocation 35% equities; AIR = exp ptf 
return  
 
(d): Asset allocation 20% equities; AIR > exp ptf 
return 
 
Personal buffers   
Another novel aspect of the legislation is that unexpected shocks do not have to be transferred 
immediately to income shocks but instead can be buffered. Smoothing shocks through personal 
buffers allows risky investing but also rather stable year-on-year pension income. To prevent large 
shocks at the end of life, investment should have a lifecycle profile in which investment risk is 
reduced as the individual participants grow older. The maximum so-called recovery period over 
which shocks can be smoothed is ten years. This is the same smoothing (or recovery) period as in 
Dutch DB contracts. Smoothing shocks in this way is optimal if participants feature habit formation 
and need time to adjust their standard of living to unexpected shocks.  
 
Income versus capital frame: risk management  
An important aspect of Dutch DC products is that risk management aims at a stable lifelong income 
stream during retirement. This contrasts with the typical design of DC schemes in Australia and the 
US, where the investment strategy tends to aim at maximum pension capital at retirement at 
accepted levels of capital risk. In contrast to this capital frame, the Dutch income frame aims at 
maximum retirement income at accepted levels of income risk. Accordingly, interest risk 
management becomes important. Indeed, the income that can be drawn from a fixed amount of 
capital depends on the interest rate.  
 
Transparency 
The accumulated pension capital and the investment returns are to be reported annually in Dutch 
DC products. It seems natural also both in the accumulation and decumulation phase to distinguish 
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explicitly between the impact of costs, investment returns, biometric returns and contributions and 
payouts.  In addition, income projections should be included. As participants age, communication in 
terms of income rather than capital is likely to become more important. In fact, the retirement 
product becomes more of an insurance than an investment product during the payout phase.  The 
details on participant information during each phase of the life course are still to be set, but both 
remaining capital, investment returns, biometric returns, expected income and income in optimistic 
and pessimistic scenarios are likely to be included.  
 
Tailoring to individual features 
The personal nature of a DC plan enables the provider to tailor contribution and payout level, 
investment strategy and insurance elements (e.g. to have a partner pension) to the characteristics 
and preferences of the individual participant. All kinds of choices in the accumulation phase, such as 
additional or lower contributions, and preferences for investment strategies (including sustainable 
investing) can easily be offered actuarially fairly (i.e. without affecting other participants in the fund). 
Collective decision making on adequate defaults is likely to remain important. Investment choices 
can be combined with collective investing through mutual funds. During the payout phase, individual 
choices on insurance and dissaving must be limited in order to prevent selection. Indeed, the 
insurance element becomes more important as participants age: a larger part of the overall return 
consists of a biometric return. Early in the payout phase, selection is not yet likely to be important.  
 
Collective risk allocation 
The regulation distinguishes between individual risk allocation and collective risk allocation during 
the payout phase of DC schemes. This distinction does not refer to collective investing or to 
collective governance. These latter collective elements can be present also in case of individual risk 
allocation. The distinguishing feature of collective risk allocation18 is that annual adjustments in 
benefit payments are uniform across all participants. Treating all participants in the same way 
regarding the development of their income may avoid controversies and may give people more 
confidence that they are not mistreated.  The drawback is that the individual risk and payout profiles 
cannot be tailored to individual features. As regards the allocation of financial risk, collective risk 
allocation is a special case of individual risk allocation and thus does not offer more opportunities to 
share systematic risk. Indeed, the pricing of the variable annuities when the capital is converted into 
lifelong payments must be on the basis of market value. Hence, risk-sharing with participants that do 
not yet participate in the pool is excluded.  
 
            
5. The future of Dutch DB contracts  
This Section considers the future of the DB contract (described in section 3). As mentioned in the 
introduction, a reform is currently under discussion for DB pensions. This reform replaces (deferred) 
variable annuities by financial assets such as individual entitlements. The proposed system involves 
not only financial assets in personal accounts but also insurance contracts pooling longevity risks.  
The main difference between the two new contract types is the presence of collective buffers (i.e. of 
assets that are not yet allocated to particular individuals). These buffers are added to share 
                                                            
18 In case of collective risk allocation, agents gradually buy in to the decumulation vehicle over a period of ten 
years before retirement. In this way, agents will be less vulnerable to interest-rate risk affecting the prevailing 




systematic risks with future pension savers. The reformed DB contracts are referred to as personal 
pensions with risk-sharing and collective buffers (PPR-CB).  
The collective buffer mechanism 
The Sociaal Economische Raad (Socio Economic Council; SER)19 developed a prototype of a PPR-CB 
contract20 (SER (2016)). This contract adds a collective buffer to the PPR contract with only personal 
accounts and personalized buffers described in section 4. On the one hand, returns on the risky 
investments in the personal accounts in excess of a certain threshold (say 10%) are added to the 
collective buffer. On the other hand, personal accounts are supplemented from the buffer if the 
risky investments in these accounts yield seriously negative returns (say less than -5%). To stabilize 
buffers, these rules apply only if the buffer is positive and less than a certain percentage (say 20%) of 
the total value in personal accounts. Collective buffers in fact implement intergenerational risk-
sharing with generations that do not yet own personal accounts. In particular, the value of the 
benefits accrued by these generations exceeds the contributions if good investment returns by 
previous generations have built up a large buffer. If bad historical returns have depleted collective 
buffers so that these buffers are only small or non-existent, the situation is reversed. In that case, 
future generations pay implicit taxes on their pension contributions to replenish buffers.    
Intergenerational risk-sharing: Completing financial markets ….     
The added value of intergenerational risk-sharing as implemented through pension funds is heavily 
debated in the Netherlands. Intergenerational risk-sharing is welfare increasing because future 
generations can benefit from risk premia by taking on financial risks before starting to contribute to 
the pension system (see e.g. Gollier (2008) and Ball and Mankiw (2007)). Collective buffers can also 
alleviate borrowing constraints of young participants who want to have a large exposure to 
investment risk. By allowing future and young generations to participate more in financial markets 
by borrowing against the collateral of their human capital, intergenerational risk-sharing completes 
financial markets21.  
…versus discontinuity risks  
The downside of taking financial risk on the basis of the collateral of human capital is so-called 
discontinuity risk: future generations might not be willing to participate if they have to pay an 
implicit tax on their contributions to replenish collective buffers. Indeed, what is risk-sharing ex ante 
becomes redistribution ex post. Hence, mandatory participation is required to commit future 
generations to risk-sharing with present generations. Mandatory participation, however, does not 
allow unlimited intergenerational risk-sharing because workers still have various ways to avoid 
implicit taxes associated with risk-sharing. In particular, they may reduce labor supply to the formal 
economy, become self-employed or switch to another sector.  Intergenerational risk-sharing may 
also generate political risks. Indeed, generations that suffer from risk-sharing ex post may want to 
change the system.   
Numerical estimates of trade-off 
Clearly a trade-off exists between the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing and the drawbacks in 
terms of discontinuity risk. This trade-off varies across pension funds. In particular, sectors differ in 
                                                            
19 The SER is one of the main advisory bodies for the Dutch government. It consists of employer organizations, labor unions and 
independent members.  
20 In Dutch policy discussions PPR-CB is known as SER IV-C, whereas the PPR contracts described in Section 4 with individual and collective 
risk allocation are known as respectively SER IV-A and SER IV-B.  
21 Collective buffers can also be used to share changes in life expectancy (macro longevity risk).    
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the sector-specificity of human capital or the prospects for continuity of the sector (based on e.g. 
the presence or absence of international competition).  Based on models that abstract from 
discontinuity risk, Boeijen et al. (2015) present estimates of the welfare gains from intergenerational 
risk-sharing. This analysis assumes a smoothing period of ten years, which is similar to smoothing 
periods in the current “DB” contracts. These gains amount to about 1% to 2% of supplementary 
pension income22.  Alleviation of borrowing constraints of young participants can double the welfare 
gain from collective buffers. In order to get an idea of discontinuity risk, Boeijen et al. (2015)  
estimate that the implicit tax for new participants after poor investment outcomes can be as high as 
40% of the contributions after poor investment results (5 % quantile).            
Collective buffers: benefits… 
Other arguments against and in favor of collective buffers exist. An important argument in favor of 
collective buffers is that they require mandatory participation of firms in sectoral funds. Without 
mandatory participation at a sectoral level, individuals and newly established firms face incentives to 
avoid participation if the buffer is to be restored. Mandatory participation reduces marketing and 
other transaction costs. Mandatory participation in sectoral funds and risk-sharing with future 
generations is essential for labor unions.  Unions also want to avoid that individual participants must 
enter financial markets themselves without the aid of trustees who design choice architectures, 
combat agency issues and enhance the bargaining position vis-à-vis financial institutions.  
Mandatory participation protects the role of trustees in these governance issues and protects the 
market share of the Dutch pension funds vis-à-vis commercial insurers.  
…and costs  
A drawback of collective buffers is that they add complexity, thereby reducing transparency and 
giving rise to governance risks.  The implicit taxes and subsidies on pension contributions implied by 
intergenerational risk-sharing makes it more difficult to price individualized elements fairly. Fair 
pricing is important to protect other participants when personal contributions and investments are 
tailored to individual needs. These cost considerations support the notion that the collective buffers 
should remain positive and be small (say up to 20%) compared to the personalized accounts.    
PPR-CB versus DB and DC  
Compared to Dutch DB contracts, the reformed PPR-CB contracts increase transparency and reduce 
conflicts of interests across participants. Moreover, they raise the scope for tailoring (dis)saving, 
financial risks, and insurance to individual needs. Compared to the Dutch DC, the collective buffers 
add intergenerational risk-sharing and thus support mandatory participation. At the same time, 
however, these buffers introduce discontinuity risk. Moreover, they introduce conflicts of interest 
and reduce transparency— for example, in pricing personalized savings, investment and insurance 
decisions. Indeed, pricing individual decisions becomes more complicated in the presence of buffers.  
Impacts on pensions in payment…  
The Dutch SCP (The Netherlands Institute for Social Research) has repeatedly argued that 
participants are concerned mainly about the adequacy and risks of pension incomes rather than 
about the more technical arguments about transparency, governance and tailoring to individual 
characteristics and preferences. As regards the level of pensions, pension payments have typically 
not been compensated for inflation since 2008. Many funds even cut pensions in payment in 
nominal terms in 2013.  In the current macroeconomic environment with low nominal interest rates 
                                                            
22 Agents that enter the system after older generations have replenished the buffer at the equilibrium level 
experience a gain in welfare of about 4 % of supplementary pension income.   
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in the EMU, the Dutch solvency rules for computing funding rates on the basis of risk-free rates 
imply that many DB funds are probably not able to raise nominal pension rights in line with prices 
and wages in the years to come. Another reason for this negative outlook for pension payments is 
that these solvency requirements compel pension funds to accumulate buffers in addition to full 
nominal funding. These additional reserves are required to buffer investment risks.   
An important argument in favor of reform is that the PPR is likely to raise pensions in payment23 and 
projected pension incomes for current workers. The reason is that a PPR allows more flexibility than 
DB contracts in the choice of the speed with which pension capital is paid out. In contrast to the 
situation in a DB system, adjustment of the AIR in the PPR does not lead to redistribution of 
resources across generations24 and thus does not result in intergenerational conflicts; in a PPR, the 
AIR determines only the speed with which personal accounts are depleted during the payout phase.  
Whereas DB contracts employ risk-free interest rates to compute solvency, the PPR allows the use of 
a risk premium in the computation of the AIR25. This results in more dissaving and thus larger 
pension benefits in the short run26.  Another reason that the PPR and PPR-CB will be more attractive 
for current participants compared to the DB contract is that no (or at least smaller) buffers must be 
accrued. Also this results in smaller saving rates in PPR, compared to DB contracts.  
 
…and income risk  
According to the SCP, the second main concern for participants is the level of certainty in pension 
income. Current DB benefits in the Netherlands are uncertain, as evidenced by the cuts in nominal 
pension payments in 2013. Introduction of the PPR can be attractive for participants because risk 
levels can be tailored to individual circumstances. In fact, older participants can opt for guaranteed 
income.  Guaranteed income at higher ages is much less expensive than long-term guarantees. It 
thus is more attractive than guaranteeing pension payments at younger ages.  
 
  
                                                            
23 A 1% higher AIR will approximately generate a 5% higher income for a 75 year-old with a remaining life 
expectancy of 10 and therefore a duration of 5.    
24 The reason is that individual property rights in PPR contracts are defined in capital, while property rights in 
DB contracts are defined in annuity entitlements. Hence, if the AIR is adjusted, the market values of individual 
rights do not change in a PPR. This is in contrast to the value of annuity entitlements in a DB system.  
25 If one aims at a stable real pension, however, one should take into account future cost-of-living adjustments. 
This may result in lower dissaving rates. Unlike the case of DB funds in the US (see Lucas and Zeldes (2009), 
Rauh and Novy-Marx (2011) and Novy-Marx (2015)), the AIR is likely to be capped using the 35% exposure cap 
that was implemented for Dutch DC contracts; see Section 4. At current interest rates, this implies a cap on the 
AIR of about 3% in nominal terms.   
26 If constant expected real pensions are targeted, the risk premium must exceed the expected inflation in 
order for the short-run benefits to increase in the PPR system compared to the current DB design.   
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Concerns about PPR-CB 
Whereas many political parties and several large pension funds support PPR-CB, others (including 
the labor unions) still have their doubts. They have five main concerns.  
Concern #1: Income frame in communication 
First of all, one fears that reporting pension capital in the decumulation phase would trigger a feeling 
of insecurity amongst older participants who would see their capital being depleted. To address this 
concern, one could focus communication with retired participants on lifelong income rather than on 
capital – even though individual property rights are defined in terms of capital rather than annuity 
entitlements. For younger workers, in contrast, one may prefer focusing more on capital.  
Concern #2: Risk-sharing and pooling based on mandatory participation    
The second main concern is that the PPR-CB would feature less intergenerational risk-sharing and 
shift more risks to the individual. Mandatory participation in insurance pools would become more 
difficult to maintain in a design based on a more individualized capital frame with individual 
accounts. Completion of financial and insurance markets by sharing risks with future generations 
and pooling risks would thus be under threat. One could argue, however, that mandatory pooling is 
still needed and implemented in the new contract to avoid selection in insurance. Indeed, 
intragenerational risk-sharing (e.g. of micro longevity risk) is very similar to that in the current 
contract. Moreover, collective buffers enabling intergenerational risk-sharing still provide an 
argument for mandatory participation. The same holds true for behavioral and agency issues 
requiring collective governance. The contract design is not yet very explicit on how to deal with 
systematic longevity risk.  This can be addressed by including separate long-term contracts trading 
systematic longevity risks between generations in their personal accounts. Also these illiquid 
contracts would require mandatory participation.   
Concern #3: Collective governance: behavioral and agency issues  
A third problematic issue involves the concern that individuals would face complicated decisions in 
PPR-CB and be left to fend for themselves in retail markets, thereby raising transaction and 
marketing costs. The framing of “personal pensions” has probably led to these fears, even though 
PPR-CB retains the traditional collective governance with trustees. Indeed, the labor unions have 
repeatedly stressed that collective governance should be retained.  
Concern #4: Heterogeneity in pension funds complicates transition. 
Dutch pension funds differ substantially in age composition, in generosity of the benefits, and in 
investment strategies. This obscures a clear view of the impact of the new contract for individual 
funds. The labor unions currently (July 2017) insist on additional computations in order to clarify the 
implications of the new contract for individual funds to ensure support of their members for the 
Summary of main concerns about the new design 
 Capital frame of entitlement confuses elderly 
 Capital frame not helpful in completing markets through mandatory intergenerational risk-
sharing and intragenerational risk pooling   
 Behavioral and agency issues in more individualized pension systems  
 Heterogeneity in pension funds complicates transition  
 Transition: how not only to remove the PAYG element in uniform contribution and accrual 




reform. Many pension funds are currently analyzing the feasibility of the new contracts 
(Pensioenfederatie (2016)). 
Concern #5: Transition issues: remove the PAYG element in uniform contribution and accrual rates ….. 
Last but not least, two transition issues must be addressed. First, the transition for the uniform 
accrual and contribution system to an actuarially neutral system with an age-independent 
contribution level implies that the transitional generations must pay off the implicit debt associated 
with the pay-as-you-go elements in the current DB system. Moreover, the transition from a 
contribution level that rises with age in the current DC system to an age-independent contribution 
level implies that pension savings must temporarily be increased. Indeed, older workers still need 
the back-loading of the old system in order to accumulate adequate pension capital. At the same 
time, younger generations must save more in the presence of more front-loading.     
…and convert deferred annuities in capital   
Another transition involves the transition from a DB system based on individual entitlements in 
terms of deferred annuities to a DC system based on individual property rights in terms of capital. A 
first option is a gradual transition: close the existing DB contract for new accrual but continue to run 
it alongside the new DC vehicle for new accruals. A second option is a fast transition: transfer 
existing annuity entitlements to individual property rights in terms of capital in personal accounts. In 
effect, this amounts to a value transfer from the DB to the DC system, which requires valuing 
present annuity entitlements in the DB system and allocating funding imbalances to individual 
participants. This is a complicated issue in view of the many option-like elements27 in the current DB 
contracts. The value of these options depends on investment strategies and results in gaps between 
market and legal book values.    
Dual transition 
 The generational distributional effects of the two transitions of moving to age-independent accruals 
in terms of capital and quickly transforming the existing DB rights into capital in personal accounts 
seem to largely offset each other (see SER (2016)). This is an argument in favor of a so-called dual 
transition in which both transitions are combined. The transition to age-independent accruals in 
terms of capital benefits young workers and future participants who no longer have to pay the 
implicit tax generated by the PAYG element in the current uniform contribution and accrual system. 
This transition hurts older workers who lose their implicit subsidies on contributions in the DB 
system. Converting existing DB rights into capital in personal accounts at least partially compensates 
the loss of implicit subsidies for older workers, for two reasons. First, no (PPR-VA) or smaller (PPR-
CB) buffers are to be built up by these generations. Second, the possibility of using a higher AIR (due 
to a risk premium) in the PPR system compared to the lower risk-free interest rate as AIR in DB 
allows for more flexibility in the speed with which pension capital is paid out.   
6. Potential lessons for other countries  
The main design questions for funded pension contracts are similar across countries. Dutch policy 
discussions have benefited from designs and experiences in other countries (see e.g. Ponds and 
Garcia Huitron (2016) and Bovenberg, Cox and Lundbergh (2016)). This section focusses on elements 
of the Dutch design that might be of interest for other countries.    
                                                            
27 One of the examples is the obligation to impose unconditional cuts if the funded rate in 2020 (2019 for some funds) has been below the 





Potential lesson #1: Income stream during retirement as the starting point 
A first important element of the Dutch designs that might be relevant elsewhere is that the income 
stream during retirement (in terms of median level and risk properties) is taken as the starting point 
for determining contributions, payouts, investment and insurance. This so-called Defined Ambition 
(DA) perspective (see e.g. van Bilsen and Bovenberg (2017) and Bovenberg and Nijman (2016)) 
typically leads to higher savings and insurance rates. As regards risk management, DA generalizes 
the liability-driven investment from guaranteed DB plans to personal accounts with stochastic 
benefits. Indeed, compared to guarantees in DB, DA offers more flexibility in risk-return trade-offs.  
A PPR-VA of the Dutch DC type yields transparency about individual property rights and fair pricing. 
The capital frame on property rights facilitates choice. In particular, fair pricing allows trustees 
Summary of potential lessons for other countries 
1. Income frame  
 The Defined Ambition approach specifies the desirable properties of the income stream 
(level and stability) and derives the adequate contribution, drawdown, insurance and 
investment strategies from these goals for retirement income.   
 An income-oriented frame for communication is easier to understand for participants and 
typically generates higher contribution rates.  
 The focus on pension income supports stable pension income by triggering the required 
hedging of fluctuations in future expected returns (e.g. interest rates).   
2. Personal buffers and biometric returns in the decumulation phase 
 An income frame in communication and design of the draw-down strategy can be 
combined (see e.g. Brown et al. (2008)) with a capital frame for defining property rights in 
order to facilitate fair pricing of choices and avoid opaqueness 
 Flexibility in draw-down strategies (AIR) does not give rise to intergenerational conflicts of 
interest  
 Personal buffers (smoothing) can be used to reconcile stable retirement income with 
substantive risk taking in the decumulation phase.  Life cycle investments can be used to 
compensate the reduction in absorption capacity if the individual ages during the 
decumulation phase.  
 Biometric returns can be used to frame insurance elements (e.g. with respect to longevity 
risks in late life) 
3. Unbundling 
 Unbundling and pricing the various functions of pension products allows one to combine 
innovatively the strengths of both the DB design (income frame, risk management, 
insurance elements, defaults) and DC design (clear property rights,  transparent link 
between contribution and accrual of entitlements, tailoring to characteristics,  
preferences and risk factors).  
 The unbundling facilitates also tailoring pension schemes to the specific features of 
particular countries. The helps Pan European Personal Pensions to respect the 
institutional setting of each particular European country in accordance with the 
subsidiarity principle.    
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and/or individual participants to flexibly decide on (dis)saving, investment and insurance choices on 
the basis of an income frame. Accordingly, the capital frame for entitlements and pricing is thus 
complementary with an income frame for structuring choices and communication.   
Potential lesson #2: Personal buffers and biometric returns  
The transparency of the capital frame can be combined with smoothing of investment risk during the 
payout phase. The PPR design with smoothing is relevant for countries that are looking for 
alternatives for guaranteed pension products (which have become rather unattractive in the current 
low interest environment), but still want to maintain stable, lifelong retirement incomes. The 
personalized buffers associated with the smoothing mechanism of investment risk contribute to the 
year-on-year stability of the income stream while participants at the same time benefit from the risk 
premium on financial investment risk as a result of lifecycle investment. Hedging changes in future 
returns (e.g. interest rate risk) also contributes to a better risk-return trade-off.  If desired, collective 
buffers can add intergenerational risk-sharing.       
Another factor contributing to adequate levels of retirement income with low risk is the pooling of 
idiosyncratic longevity risk in mandatory pools. Longevity insurance generates an additional 
biometric return, which is especially important at advanced age. Indeed, countries may want to 
stimulate various forms of longevity insurance for the eventuality that people become very old. 
Indeed, in policy discussions in many countries (including Australia, the US and the UK), deferred 
annuity solutions have been advocated. The PPR design includes pension products that become 
more of an insurance product at the end of the lifecycle but offers more flexibility28. Other 
insurances, such as health and care insurance, may supplement longevity insurance.  
Potential lesson #3: Unbundling  
The PPR design allows unbundling of the various functions of retirement products in order to 
reconcile transparency, fair pricing and adequate governance with flexibility to tailor (dis)saving, 
investment and insurance to heterogeneous income needs (see Bovenberg and Nijman (2016)). Each 
particular country, sector or firm can build an appropriate mix of collective and individual elements. 
Indeed, the PPR design allows one to combine the strengths of DB and DC. In this context, collective 
investing, collective governance, and uniform adjustments in pension payments entitlements should 
be carefully distinguished. Also various risk factors (equity risk, interest risk, inflation risk, micro and 
macro longevity risk) can be unbundled. One can, for example, choose exposure to equity risk, and 
at the same time hedge interest rate risk and micro longevity risk. Separate contracts can share  
macro longevity risk between generations. The PPR concept can also be adapted to settings in which 
stable income streams are required only for a limited number of periods or in which guaranteed 
lifetime income streams are to be provided after a particular age.   
The flexibility of the PPR concept makes it particularly relevant in the context of Pan European 
Pension Plans (PEPPs) proposed in the European Union (see European Union (2017)).  European 
countries differ substantially in how they organize the decumulation of pension capital. PPR shows 
how PEPPs can be designed flexibly to tailor to various traditions, including, for example, integrating 
accumulation and decumulation phases. The current PEPPs proposals still largely ignore this aspect 
and focus on the accumulation stage.    
                                                            
28 In order to limit selection effects, long-term insurance contracts must be committed to at advanced ages. 
Early in retirement, however, more flexible insurance contracts are feasible. This provides the possibility to 
adapt to changes in circumstances and preferences.  
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6. Conclusions   
Discussions on reforming Dutch occupational pensions have been going on for some time now. In 
2015, the Socio Economic Council (SER) issued an advisory report referring to personal pensions with 
collective risk-sharing as an interesting option. Over the last two years, SER and others have 
developed the concept in more detail. A number of political parties and pension funds now support 
it. Also Dutch DC pensions have been redesigned to allow for risk taking during the pay-out phase. 
At the time of writing, the Socio Economic Council has not yet come to a final recommendation— 
but the direction for the future seems to be clear. The political parties that are negotiating to form a 
new government advocate some form of personal pension as an alternative for the DB funds. Hence, 
PPR-CB contracts are likely to be introduced. A PPR design that unbundles various functions of 
retirement products might also have attractive features for other countries. These features include 
an income frame, personal buffers, and the biometric-return frame to add longevity insurance for 
the end of life.  Unbundling the various functions of retirement products in the PPR design allows for 
flexibility of countries, social partners and individuals to select their own combinations of building 
blocks of a retirement product – depending on their own institutions, preferences and 
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